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ESTIMATING MARGINAL COSTS AND MARKET POWER
IN THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS
BRUNO BOSCO, LUCIA PARISIO, AND MATTEO PELAGATTI
Abstract. In this paper we examine the bidding behaviour of rm
competing in the Italian wholesale electricity market where generators
submit hourly supply schedule to sell power. We describe the institu-
tional characteristics of the Italian market and derive generators' equi-
librium bidding functions. We also discuss the main empirical strategies
followed by the recent econometrical literature to obtain estimates of
(unobservable) optimal bids. Then, we use individual bid data, quan-
tity volumes and other control variables to compare actual bidding be-
haviour to theoretical benchmarks of prot maximization. We obtain
estimates of generators' costs to be used in conjunction with hourly mar-
ket equilibrium prices to derive some measures of the extent of market
power in the Italian electricity sector and of its exploitation by rms.
JEL codes: D24, L13, L41, L94, L98.
Keywords: Bidding behaviour in Electricity markets; Estimates of op-
timal bid functions; Measures of market power.
1. Introduction
In the last twenty years electricity markets have been signicantly re-
shaped all around the world. Previous vertically integrated enterprises,
generally owned by the state, have been split in separated autonomous (gen-
erally private) entities each entitled to carry on a specic activity roughly
corresponding to single productive segments of the previous integrated rms
(basically, generation, transportation, delivery and retail). The physical
electricity network has been structured as an autonomous organization (ei-
ther an Agency or a private company) that sells to generators the usage
of the transmission capacity. In turn, generators compete for the whole-
sale supply of bulk electricity on newly created electricity auctions where a
market coordinator supervise the demand-supply matching. These auctions
normally work as single price competitive markets and operate on hour/daily
frequency on the basis of both supply and demand merit orders. The gen-
eral expectation that has inspired these vast reforms was that technological
advances in the generation sector may allow several generators to play the
competitive game among them and oer electricity at nearly competitive
prices. Previous state owned rms were generally subjected to a cost-plus
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regulation which implied that, up to a certain point and under some limi-
tations, the nal consumers were bearing the risk of any cost increase (fuel,
transportation, delivery costs, and so on). Hence, the creation of wholesale
electricity auctions represented a means to reduce the extent of the costs
pass-trough because the necessity to compete for despatching in the auction
should moderate the price increase brought about by cost increase more ef-
fectively that any politically inspired regulation. Several studies, however,
show that generators still earn signicant extra-prots and have large ex-
tents of market power to exploit. At the same time other studies show that
in many cases generators might obtain even higher prots if they acted more
aggressively on the markets, i.e. if they posted supply bids higher than the
actual ones and yet below the price ceiling limits xed by regulation author-
ities. Then, strong market power exists but apparently it is not always fully
exploited. The correct estimation of the price-cost margins has therefore be-
come a crucial element in the overall evaluation of the impact of the above
mentioned reforms on the eciency of the electricity markets and welfare.
In this paper we pursue a twofold purpose. On the one hand we try and
estimate price-cost margins and Lerner Indexes for a large sample of Ital-
ian generators competing in the Italian electricity auction during four years
(2005-2006-2007-2008) in order to evaluate the existence and the extent of
market power in that period and to explain it on the basis of some char-
acteristics of the Italian market (level and regional distribution of demand,
regional location and capacity of generators, grid congestion, etc.). On the
other hand we evaluate the way in which the dynamics of costs' components
(fuel price above all) aect generation costs and nal electricity prices. By
testing for a possible dierential impact of, say, a gas price increase on costs
and prices, we test for the hypothesis that electricity auctions smooth costs
increase ( i.e. limit the extent to which cost increases are transferred to
prices) and then somehow protect consumers from avoidable price increases
through the simple force of competition among generators and without di-
rect state intervention. In order to do so we recover hourly generation cost
from supply bids and residual demand elasticity and compute Lerner Index
accordingly. This permits the estimation of the magnitude of market power,
its evolution over time and its distribution across rms and regions. Then
we use the series of calculated costs and equilibrium price to estimate the
elasticity of the two series to fuel price variations and present inference of
the above mentioned \smoothing attitude"of electricity auctions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey discuss the
theoretical modelling of electricity auctions and the main issues raised by
the empirical estimation of costs and market power. Section 3 contains a
description of the Italian electricity auction (auction rules and structural
characteristics of the generation sector) as well as the main properties of the
generation process of the data used in this paper. In section 4 we present a
share-auction model of bidding behavior from which we derive explicit rela-
tions between prices, costs and residual demand elasticities that will be used
in the empirical part of the paper. Section 5 contains the estimated values
of marginal costs and Lerner indexes for the Italian market and section 6MARGINAL COSTS AND MARKET POWER IN THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS 3
includes the estimated elasticities of generation costs and equilibrium prices
to Brent price. Section 7 briey concludes.
2. Modelling bidding behavior in electricity auctions
There is a growing body of literature that analyses electricity markets
on both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Wholesale electricity
markets can be modeled as multi-unit auctions where multiple identical
objects are bought/sold and demand/supply is not restricted to a single
unit. From the theoretical point of view, the analysis concentrates mainly
on the properties of the market design (various possible auction formats) and
on the strategic behavior of auction participants, whereas the main focus of
applied researchers is on the estimation of rms' market power.
From a theoretical point of view, like other cases of auctions for identical
and divisible objects { such as Treasury Bills { electricity auctions are often
analyzed as quota or share auctions. Ausubel and Cramton (2002), follow-
ing the line of research rst introduced by Wilson (1979), found that when
multiple units are sold simultaneously under the uniform price rule, buyers
have an incentive to \shade" their demand (reduce their valuation) for all
units following the rst. In this manner they optimally trade-o a lower
probability of winning on the last units against savings on all units bought.
Electricity markets, in which the majority of sellers own a number of gen-
erating units, show the same type of incentives on the supply side because
overbidding on the last units increases the revenues for all the inframarginal
units despatched in equilibrium. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) were the
rst to apply this approach to electricity auctions in a model of complete in-
formation about opponents' costs. Many researchers have implemented and
rened this model
1 which { after the work of Crespo (2001) { became known
with the name of Bid Function Equilibria (BFE). BFE, combining complete
information with a discrete action space for bidders, predicts asymmetric
bidding behavior for bidders: the price setter inates his bid to raise the
equilibrium price, whereas the other rms have a Nash equilibrium response
which equates bids at marginal costs. This is easy to understand since in a
multi-unit auction with uniform price rule a high price is a public good. A
similar (bid shading) result was obtained by Parisio et al (2003; 2008) who
relaxed the assumption of costs common knowledge and derived equilibrium
bid functions in both isolated and interconnected electricity markets show-
ing that the extent of the bid shading, and therefore the mark-up, depends
among other things upon the endowments of generation capacity of each
multi-plant rms.
The empirical analysis of electricity auctions is conducted following two
intersecting lines of research. On the one hand, following the literature
on the econometrics of auction data pioneered by Guerre et al. (2000), re-
searchers aim at recovering the marginal cost functions (valuations) of rms
from bid data, under the assumption that each bidder is acting optimally
against the distribution of the bids of the opponents. Guerre et al. (2000)
1For example, Brunekreft (2001), Garcia-Diaz and Marin (2003, Fabra (2003), Fabra,
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suggest a non-parametric (indirect) approach based on the fact that the dis-
tribution of the (unknown) bidders' valuations is uniquely identied by the
distribution of observed bids. Using the rst order conditions for the optimal
bid functions, a sample of pseudo-valuations can be obtained for a given set
of N bidders observed in a series of L auctions. Other authors estimate mar-
ket power (Lerner Index, price-cost markup and the like) of electricity rms
under the assumptions that costs are known to the researcher. Some other
studies follow a combination of both approaches. However, the multi-unit
dimension of the electricity auctions poses econometric problems stronger
than those of the above mentioned single-unit case. In particular, the in-
terpretation of data generated in equilibrium in the multi-unit case is more
troublesome even when the econometrician can observe the equilibrium dis-
tribution of all bids (Athey et al, 2006). Crawford et al. (2007) test the
predictions of BFE using data on bid functions submitted into the England
and Wales spot market from 1993 to 1995. They found strong support to the
prediction of asymmetric bidding behavior between the price setter and the
non-price setters; the mark-up increases with the amount of inframarginal
capacity sold by rms and this eect is more pronounced for the price-setter.
All together Crawford et al. (2007) found that the estimated bid function
for the price setter has a lower intercept and a steeper slope than the ones
of non-price setters.
Horta csu and Puller (2007) characterize the bidding behavior of electric-
ity generators within the theoretical framework of Wilson's share auction.
Before them, Wolak (2003) used a similar model of optimal bidding behavior
to recover cost function estimates for electricity generation in the Australian
National Electricity Market. He shows that under the assumption of rm-
level prot maximization, it is possible to estimate the level of marginal cost
implied by a given equilibrium price and quantity. Observed bid data can
be used to compute directly the Lerner Index of market power.
Another line of applied research, starting from the work of Wolfram
(1999), estimates the extent of market power in electricity markets mea-
suring the price-cost margins earned by rms. This approach diers from
the auction approach since marginal costs of rms are assumed to be known.
Mark-ups are calculated using data of equilibrium prices in the British Pool
and marginal costs of the suppliers which are recovered using information
on fuel costs and from an industry survey. Results indicate that prices are
higher than marginal costs but rms to not fully exploit prot opportuni-
ties predicted by most theoretical models for the case of duopolists facing
inelastic demand.
The nding that rms fail to exploit the full extent of market power in
electricity markets is a quite common result in the applied literature. One
possible explanation of this suboptimal behavior relies on the fact that rms
may be vertically integrated which means that may be active on both sides
of the auction. Considering the two-sided wholesale Spanish spot electricity
market where integrated rms can be either net demanders or net suppliers
(since they can sell electricity as generators and simultaneously buy it as
dealers to resell it in the retail market), K uhn et al. (2004) postulate that
if the rms have similar degree of market power, prices may not di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from perfect competition. In the reality prices can dier from competitive
price but { due to the above mentioned possible net position of the rms
steaming from vertical integration { average price-cost margins will not in-
form about the existence of substantial market power in the spot market
since bids will depend on the net demand position of the integrated rms in
that market. Net demanders will overproduce while net sellers will under-
produce. Although this may not signicantly aect spot prices and market
power, yet it can induce a misallocation of the generation assets which in
turn may produce an eciency loss. To estimate market power they follow
a structural approach and estimate a encompassing but parsimonious sup-
ply function model with vertical integration in which the operation of rms
as both seller and buyer was taken into account. Cost parameters were
indirectly recovered from this estimation and used with inverse elasticity
estimates for market power evaluation. They conclude that market power
is quite pervasive in the Spanish spot market but vertical integration and
market power on both sides of the market prevent prices to go as far above
or below the market price as would be the case with one sided market power.
Other explanations might be sought by looking at the physical limitation
of the grid. The ow of electricity across zones is limited by the (known)
physical capacity of the interconnection and this in turn imposes a (known)
ceiling to the quantity that can be exported. If ask bids posted by generators
are used to price the transportation capacity across zones bid moderation
might be a rational choice particularly on the part of those generators that
are located near frequently congested zones.
3. The Italian market
In this section we present the data generating process of Italian electricity
prices. First we introduce the main characteristics of the Italian electricity
industry and then we will analyze the market rules of the Italian wholesale
electricity market (IPEX). Our data analysis will refer mainly to our sample
period (2005-2008).
IPEX started its operations in April 2004 with bidders acting on the sup-
ply side only. The demand side of the market became active since January
2005. Since then the participation2 in the MGP markedly increased: in the
year 2008 there have been 81 operators on the supply side and 91 operators
on the demand side. In the same year, the volume of energy exchanged on
the MGP amounted at 232 TWh with a liquidity rate3 of the 69%.
The total energy production comes from dierent technologies/fuels em-
ployed: the Italian industry is characterized by an high quota of thermal
production (around 80% for all the sample period) which includes technolo-
gies based on oil, gas and carbon. Hydro production amounts at 15% but it
is mainly concentrated in the North Zone whereas the South Zone shows a
productive mix more concentrated on thermal (90.2%) than on hydro (6.2%)
with some increasing share of wind production (3.5%). Finally both islands,
2Data are taken from the last report published by the GME in 2009, \Annual report
2008".
3The liquidity rate is the ratio of the value of electricity traded in the power exchange
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Sardinia and Sicily, show a productive mix more concentrated on thermal
technologies: 91.6% in Sicily (of which 69.1 on CCGT) and 91.4% in Sar-
dinia (of which 51.3% from carbon and 38% from CCGT). Hydro production
has a low share in both islands but wind production is growing considerably,
having attracted new investments in the last years. Figure 1 summarizes the
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Figure 1. Production by font (GWh)
Before liberalization the Italian electricity industry was dominated by a
state-owned monopolist (ENEL) that controlled all the stages of activity,
from generation to nal sale. By the time the sector was opened to compe-
tition a portion of generation capacity previously controlled by ENEL has
been sold to newcomers with the intention of creating a more levelled play-
ing eld. In Figure 2 we present data on market share for years 2007 and
2008.
The increased competition in the IPEX did not have much inuence on
wholesale prices. On the contrary, electricity prices showed an increasing
trend during our sample period. Table 1 reports annual averages for dierent
time slots like peak, o-peak. holidays, etc.
2008 2007 2006 2005
Total 86.99 70.99 74.75 58.59
Week day 91.06 76.48 81.43 64.98
Peak 114.38 104.90 108.73 87.80
O peak 67.75 48.06 54.12 42.15
Holidays 77.88 58.58 60.25 44.33
















































Figure 2. Market shares of electricity producers
The comparison between the Italian market and other European markets
show that there exists a signicant gap between Italian prices and other
European prices, as it can be evaluated from Figure 3. We notice that
the French and the German markets (Powernext and EEX respectively)














Figure 3. European Wholesale Prices 2008
The IPEX is composed by a day-ahead market (MGP), an Infra-day mar-
ket and an ancillary services market (MSD). MGP operates as a daily com-
petitive market where hourly price-quantity bids are submitted by genera-
tors and by buyers. The market operator (GME) orders bids according to
a cost reducing merit order for supply and in a willingness to pay order for8 BRUNO BOSCO, LUCIA PARISIO, AND MATTEO PELAGATTI
demand. The market equilibrium is calculated in the intersection of sup-
ply and the demand. The resulting equilibrium price (SMP) is paid to all
despatched suppliers. When MGP determines an equilibrium price and a
corresponding equilibrium quantity that are compatible with the capacity
constraints of the transmission grid { both \nationally" and locally { the
wholesale electricity trade is completed. On the contrary, if the volume of
the electricity ow determined in the MGP exceeds the physical limits of
the grid and in some areas congestions occur, a new determination of zonal
prices must be obtained in order to eliminate congestion in those areas. To
this end the GME uses the bids submitted at the MGP by the generators lo-
cated in the congested areas to compute a specic merit order valid for those
zones. Then he allows a ow of electricity in and out of those zones within
the limits given by the transmission capacity and determines a specic zonal
equilibrium.
As a result of the above possible \reopening" of zonal markets the nal
equilibrium price in these zones might (and frequently does) diverge from
that determined in the MGP for the same hour of the day. Therefore,
when generators submit a supply bid in the MGP they know that their
bid accomplishes { explicitly or implicitly { a twofold scope. On the one
hand, the bid determines the position of their plant(s) in the MGP merit
order and the quantity of electricity that he should supply at the equilibrium
price. On the other hand, the bid might contribute to the denition of a
zonal merit order in the geographical area where the generator operates if
that area should be congested. This implies that even bids exceeding the
MGP equilibrium price might become useful zonal supply bids if demand is
high in their zone and there is an outow of electricity (\export" to other
connected zones) priced at the equilibrium price determined in the exporting
zone where they operate. Conversely, bids at or below the MGP equilibrium
price might not necessarily ensure dispatching to generators located in the
importing zones. Summing up, we say that each bidder bids only once (in
the MGP market) but that bid is worth twice: is an MGP bid and a potential
zonal bid.
Two main considerations are in order. Bidding in the MGP market at a
price above the equilibrium does not necessarily imply exclusion from pro-
duction since some or all of those bidders who have bid above the equilibrium
might reenter the game and sell in the zonal market at a zonal price above
the MGP equilibrium price. This opportunity is known in advance and may
aect the bidding strategy of all those who are active in the MGP market
and particularly of those generators that are located nearly frequently con-
gested zones. However, the ow of electricity across zones is limited by the
(known) physical capacity of the interconnection and this in turn imposes a
(known) ceiling to the quantity that can be exported. To some extent this
ceiling imposes a rationing on supply side and limits the number of bidders
located in the exporting zones who might be despatched to supply in the
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4. A simple model
We assume that N bidders compete in a day-ahead market with hourly
bids continuously mapping supplied quantity levels q, taken from open in-
tervals, into a price codomain Pi. We indicate the price codomain as P =
fp ;p+g = [8iPi. P is common knowledge. Before bidding to supply day-
ahead power, each bidder has entered a contract arrangement for a quantity
 Yi (a private information) to be supplied to some buyer at a predetermined
price  pi 2 P. Net day-ahead supply on the day-head market is then Si(p;  Yi).
Each bidder has costs given by Ci(q).
Total demand is ^ D(p) = D(p)+"; where " is a stochastic shift component.
For the moment we assume that there are no potential congestion problems
among zones (transmission capacity is very high) and therefore there is a
single national market that will have a single national equilibrium price.
Calling pE the equilibrium price (uniform price to be paid to all bidders
called into operation) one can write the equilibrium condition as follows:
i=N X
i=1
Si(pE;  Yi) = ^ D(pE)
and consequently the ex-post prot of each despatched bidder is
i = Si(pE;  Yi)pE   Ci(Si(pE;  Yi))  
 
pE    pi
  Yi | {z }
A
where A  0 is prot foregone in the auction because of the existing con-
tract price and A < 0 is a prot realized outside the auction (capital gain
on a contract). From the perspective of bidder i the realization of that
prot is subjected to two sources of uncertainty: " and  Y8j6=i. Following
Horta csu and Puller (2007) we dene a subjective probability measure over
the realization of the market clearing price conditional on  Yi and its supply
schedule ^ Si(p) under the assumption that the competitors are playing their
equilibrium bid strategies Sj(p;  Yj) 8j 6= i 2 N :
Hi(p; ^ Si(p);  Yi)  Pr
n





Sj(p;  Yj) + ^ Si(p;  Yi)  D(p) + " j  Yi; ^ Si(p)
o
Calling F(:;:) the joint distribution of " and  Y8j6=i conditional on  Yi the
above probability is




Sj(p;  Yj) + ^ Si(p;  Yi)  D(p) + "

dF(";  Y8j6=i j  Yi)






p^ Si(p)   Ci(^ Si(p))   (p    pi)  Yi
i
dHi(p; ^ Si(p);  Yi)
and the optimal S
i (p) is such that.
(2) pi = C
0
i(S
i (p)) + (S
i (p)    Yi)
Hi
S(p;S
i (p);  Yi)
Hi
p(p;S
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The numerator measures the shift in the probability distribution of the
market clearing price due to a change in the supply of bidder i and the de-
nominator is the density of H. Horta csu and Puller (2007) assume that the
supply function Si(p;  Yi), which indicates the quantity supplied by bidder i
at a price p; given contract position  Yi; is a continuously increasing dier-
entiable function which is additively separable in its two arguments. In this
manner it is possible to derive a manageable expression for the probability
ratio in (2), which on the whole becomes:

















8j6=i2N Sj(p)  RD0 (p)i.
Under the assumption that supplies are additively separable in prices,
Horta csu and Puller (2007, appendix B) use (3) and information about mar-
ginal costs C0 to calculate the (unobserved) contract position of bidder i;
since (S
i (p)   Yi) = 0 implies pi = C
0
i(S
i (p)); then  Yi is the level of quantity
at which the supply function intersect the marginal cost function. Then,
they are able to calculate the ex-post optimal supply function of rm i and
to compare it with the actual supply function submitted.
Our approach on the contrary, uses information about contracts to obtain
estimates of marginal costs and the implied Lerner Index of market power
like in Wolak (2003).
Let Q
i (p) indicates the quantity net of contracts submitted by rm i at


















From (5) we notice that an estimate of the Lerner Index can be obtained
from the elasticity of the residual demand facing bidder i in the equilibrium.
Prot maximizing rms oering in a non perfectly competitive market, we
expect 1  ^ RD (p) < 1: If on the contrary at the equilibrium price p we
have ^ RD (p) < 1, then the rm does not maximize prots. This means that,
for some reasons, the rm is oering a quantity in excess with respect to the
optimal one at a price level lower than the optimal one.
The computation of RDi and RD0
i (which are ex-post step functions with
either zero or innite derivatives) needed for the evaluation of (4) was carried
out by using the actual market demand and the quantity supplied by all j 6= i
bidders. Smoothness was obtained by kernel tting of residual demand data
under standard normal distribution assumptions. In Figure 4 we plot the
aggregate supply curve, the supply curve of the dominant rm (Enel), the
supply curve excluding Enel and the residual demand for Enel together withMARGINAL COSTS AND MARKET POWER IN THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS 11
their kernel-smoothed versions. The graphs refer to the auction of the 20th
May 2008 at 10 o'clock.



















































Supply curve of ENEL



























Supply curve excluding ENEL



























Residual demand vs. Supply of ENEL
Figure 4. Supply functions for ENEL and kernel smoothing
on 20th May 2008 at 10.
5. Marginal costs and Lerner Index
Equation (4) has been used to compute marginal costs (Euros per MWh)
and Lerner Index for non-dominant rms active in the Italian market from
2005 to 2007. In Figures 5 and 6 we plot as an example marginal costs {
June of the years 2005-2007 { against quantity supplied with tted lines for
two non-dominant rms; the rst one, AEM, is mainly located in the North
of Italy, whereas the second one, Edison, has plants more evenly spread
over the entire country. For the latter we also show the scatter plot of data
recorded in a regional market (Sicily) using observations recorded when that
market was isolated from the MGP market.
Marginal costs curves have positive slopes and tted values appear re-
alistic. Dierences in slopes and positions among the kernel tted curves























































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Estimated average marginal cost function for
Edison for Italy (top) and Sicily (bottom) when it forms a
separated market
some technical/organizational/learning progress. Only in one case (Edison
in Sicily), tted values show a tendency towards marginal cost constancy. In
general non concavity is the most evident characteristic of the marginal cost
behavior we recovered from the Italian market data. A possible explanation
for this result when it is referred to non-dominant rms is that these bidders
might be including in their gurative costs an opportunity-cost component
motivated by the possibility of not being dispatched (e.g. when the domi-
nant does not leave sucient market shares to them) especially during no
peak periods. In other words, bidders apply an high opportunity cost to
each produced quantity, particularly to the quantities near the maximumMARGINAL COSTS AND MARKET POWER IN THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS 13
capacity of their plants. This means that when they bid for those quantities
they inate the pure operational marginal cost (basically the cost of their
fuel) of that quantity by this \insurance" component. As a result, even
when their plants are not entirely dispatched (i.e. when they do not sell
at full capacity) their bids on the dispatched part of their supply already
cover the opportunity cost associated to the capacity that remains idle. A
similar interpretation is postulated by Wolak (2003, 167) for the Australian
case when he interprets the behavior of marginal costs recovered using bid
data generated in that market. However, he relates the opportunity costs
to hedging activity motivated by the risk of \unit outages" when they have
sold a signicant amount of forward contracts.
From Figure 6 it is also evident that Edison has rapidly expanded its







































































































Figure 7. Scatter of supplied quantity vs. estimated mar-
ginal cost
As for the dominant rm (Enel, Figure 7), the interpretation of results of
equation (4) appears more dicult. The use of ex-post actual equilibrium
price in (4) implied, given the extremely high value of the numerator of
the second term on the right hand side (generally corresponding to a value
between a third and half of the entire quantity supplied), that calculated
marginal costs result to be negative particularly when the dominant rm
was the price setter. In turn this implies that the dominant is somehow
restraining its potential market power by bidding below the optimal possible
level. When for some reasons the dominant was not the price setter, results
are more in line with those reported for non dominants. Calculated marginal
costs are positive but scatter plots do not show any reasonable quantity-cost
kernel tting.
In Table 2 we report summary statistics for the estimated Lerner Indexes.
For 2008 we report only statistics for Enel and Edison, since in that year
AEM merged with ASM forming the new company A2A, while Endesa sold
its Italian plants to E.ON.
One can appreciate the enormous dierences of mean and median values of
the Lerner index between of the dominant (when it was not price setter, see
the dierences in the number of observations) and the non dominant rms.
However, Lerner index of Enel strongly decreases over time whereas non
dominants' indexes modestly increase. Given the above mentioned limited14 BRUNO BOSCO, LUCIA PARISIO, AND MATTEO PELAGATTI
2005
ENEL EDISON ENDESA AEM
Mean 0.786 0.014 0.035 0.011
Median 0.809 0.003 0.011 0.003
Maximum 0.999 0.948 0.996 0.869
Minimum 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.141 0.053 0.082 0.047
Skewness -0.449 9.876 5.898 9.806
Kurtosis 2.302 124.281 45.585 121.819
2006
ENEL EDISON ENDESA AEM
Mean 0.627 0.017 0.027 0.015
Median 0.635 0.003 0.006 0.003
Maximum 0.999 0.986 0.976 0.990
Minimum 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.213 0.066 0.083 0.057
Skewness -0.133 7.417 5.948 8.079
Kurtosis 2.080 71.011 45.293 89.030
2007
ENEL EDISON ENDESA AEM
Mean 0.632 0.060 0.038 0.048
Median 0.632 0.007 0.004 0.004
Maximum 1.000 0.999 0.982 0.987
Minimum 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.212 0.145 0.093 0.116
Skewness -0.095 3.483 4.282 3.737
Kurtosis 2.015 16.027 26.547 19.674
2008
ENEL EDISON ENDESA AEM
Mean 0.564 0.150 . .
Median 0.544 0.049 . .
Maximum 1.000 1.000 . .
Minimum 0.117 0.000 . .
Std. Dev. 0.213 0.211 . .
Skewness 0.216 1.978 . .
Kurtosis 2.044 6.341 . .
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the Lerner indexes esti-
mated in each auction
number of observations recorded for Enel, however, one cannot interpret
these results as a reliable clue of increased competition in the Italian market.
6. Regressing cost and equilibrium prices against fuel price
Short run generation marginal costs basically depend on fuel prices, ac-
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that producers' costs react to fuel changes less intensively than equilibrium
wholesale market prices against the alternative hypothesis that electricity
market prices hamper the impact of fuel changes on consumers. Thus, the
alternative hypothesis corresponds to the idea that the actual design of
electricity auctions guaranties a \smoothed"cost increase pass-through on
consumers than any cost-plus form of regulation.
In order to test the above hypotheses we regress cost observations of
three non dominant rms { retrieved from previous calculations { against
a measure of production activity of each rm (i.e. it residual demand), a
6-month moving average of Brent prices and a time trend. At the same
time we use the same independent variables (with total quantity sold that
replaces residual demand) against the SMP dependent variable. All the
variables are in logarithms. Results are reported in Table 3.
AEM EDISON ENDESA SMP
log(Quantity) 0.24 0.24 0.16 1.33
log(Brent 6m-MA) 0.49 1.63 0.69 1.26
Linear Trend (365  24) -0.15 -0.31 0.02 -0.13
...
R-squared 0.62 0.53 0.63 0.84
S.E. of regression 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.14
Durbin-Watson stat 2.02 2.09 2.06 1.92
 denotes signicance at 1% level.
Table 3. Regression coecients for the logarithm of the
marginal costs of AEM, Edison and Endesa and for the Sys-
tem Marginal Prices (SMP).
As one can see, in each regression the time trend is negative, probably
indicating some improvements in the eciency and the variable incorporat-
ing quantity is always positive and signicant. Costs elasticity to residual
demand is in range between 16% and 24% whereas the elasticity of SMP to
total quantity is almost triple in value. Far higher than the elasticity of the
rms' costs to the Brent price is also the elasticity of SMP to Brent price,
with an estimated coecient of 1.26. There is one important exception, how-
ever, for a rm has the Brent estimated coecient equal to 1.63 which is
higher than the value estimated in SMP equation. In all, equilibrium prices
seem to react to fuel price increase more strongly that (average) generation
costs leading one into thinking that the market amplies rather than ham-
per any increase of fuel price. This would make consumers less protected
with respect to other non-market regulation mechanisms, such as price-cap
or pure cost-plus. This evidence can also be explained by observing that
the dominant rm (Enel) is the one that xes the SMP in the majority of
the auctions, and, as noted above, this rm does not follow a competitive
behaviuor in forming its supply function.
Notice, however, that this conclusions are very preliminary and drawn on
the basis of results obtained for non-dominant and non price setter rms.16 BRUNO BOSCO, LUCIA PARISIO, AND MATTEO PELAGATTI
7. Conclusions
In this paper we estimate price-cost margins and Lerner Indexes for big
Italian generators competing in the Italian electricity auction during four
years (2005-2006-2007-2008) in order to evaluate the existence and the de-
gree of market power in that period. Results indicate that there is an enor-
mous dierences of mean and median values of the Lerner index between
of the dominant rm and the non dominant competitors. However, Lerner
index of dominant decreases over time possibly as a result of tighter regula-
tion and monitoring activity on the part of Italian authorities. We have also
evaluated the way in which the dynamics of costs' components (fuel price
above all) aect generation costs and nal electricity prices. By testing for
a possible dierential impact of Brent price increase on costs and prices,
we tested for the hypothesis that electricity auctions smooth costs increase
(i.e. limit the extent to which cost increases are transferred to prices) and
then somehow protect consumers from avoidable price increases through the
simple force of competition among generators and without direct state inter-
vention. In order to do so we recovered hourly generation cost from supply
bids and residual demand and estimate their log-elasticity to Brent price.
Results are mixed but on average they indicate that contrary to expectations
equilibrium prices over-react to Brent prices and therefore the \smoothing
costs attitude" of electricity auctions should be seen with caution.
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